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The Effects of Image and Memory on
Spanish-Jewish Reconciliation
Rene H. Cardenas
The news of Francisco Franco’s death on the
morning of 20 November 1975 affected the Spanish
public in various ways.  Clothiers in grieving Galicia
and Madrid found themselves hard-pressed to provide
enough black ties and armbands to satisfy the insatia-
ble demand, a situation vastly different from the
dancing and celebrations that burst forth in the
Basque provinces of Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya.  Manuel
Vasquez Montalban, a Barcelona novelist, chronicled
the activity in the heretofore “occupied” city: “Above
the skyline of the Collserola Mountains, champagne
corks soared into the autumn twilight.  But nobody
heard a sound.”  Barcelona was, after all, a city of good
manners.1  As Franco’s body lay in state at the Sala de
Columnas of Madrid’s Palacio del Oriente, nearly
500,000 people filed past; some to mourn, others to
confirm that the was truly dead.  Compared in his
lifetime to the Archangel Gabriel, Alexander the Great,
Julius Caesar, Charlemagne, Napoleon, and Jesus
Christ, Franco was buried on 23 1975 November at
Valle de Los Caidos, outside Madrid.2  Only one
noteworthy Head of State, the Chilean dictator Gen.
Augusto Pinochet, attended the funeral.
48 Historical Perspectives March 2005
      3For a developed commentary on collective memory and anti-
memory, see Pierre Nora, Rethinking the French Past: Realms of
Memory (New York: Columbia University Press, 1992), 1-23.
After Franco’s 36-year tenure in a role of unchal-
lenged power and authority, a significant amount of
scholarship has grappled with the complex question of
his legacy.  Motivated by admiration, fascination, and
disgust, foreign observers – not Spaniards – have
spearheaded the task to represent and remember
Franco as an archetypal dictator, megalomaniac or
calculating politico.  This study will also analyze his
memory, but one that scholars have not previously
emphasized – the Jewish memory of the dictator based
upon Israeli policy toward Franquist Spain and the
details about Franco’s life that were “forgotten” in
order to generate it.
The Spanish institutionalized memory of Francisco
Franco is heavily influenced by a wide spectrum of
Spanish politicians, intellectuals, and social commen-
tators who collaborated in what came to be known as
el pacto del olvido, or pact of forgetting.  Franco was
not necessarily forgotten post-mortem, though; in-
stead, an immense national appetite for details about
the private Caudillo fueled a cathartic release of diaries
and memoirs for years after his death.  El pacto only
stressed no settling of accounts, no revenge.  No one
sought to open what was considered a Pandora’s box
for fear of igniting another devastating civil war like
the one responsible for catapulting Franco into power
forty years earlier.  Thus, collective amnesia, or anti-
memory, became the consensus of an uneasy Spanish
public.3  In the Jewish memory of the dictator, this
1
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amnesia has a different origin - one rooted in the
dictator’s ambiguous stances and policies themselves.
Although El Caudillo publicly articulated a Catho-
lic, knightly, warrior-based formula for Spanish
identity and simultaneously sought to ingratiate
himself with Sephardim communities (Jews of Spanish
ancestry), many of whom immigrated to Palestine
during or immediately after the Spanish Civil War, his
duplicity was not entirely of his own design.4  It was
also a consequence of the Jewish experience in Span-
ish history. 5  According to Norman Berdichevksy,
bitter memories of the Inquisition and the Jewish
expulsion of 1492 dominated Jewish memories of the
Iberian Peninsula for centuries.6  Equating Jews to
Moorish “infidels in league with the devil,” Spain
retained this hostile posture until immediately after
the French Revolution, and only after the adoption of
the Constitution of 1868 did official persecution come
to a halt.  Immediately thereafter, a number of Spanish
intellectuals started to question what Spain might
have lost as a result of the Sephardic eviction and its
lasting antagonism.7  Noting the important cultural,
political, and economic contributions credited to Jews
in Northern Europe, Greece, Turkey, the Caribbean,
50 Historical Perspectives March 2005
      8Jose Antonio Lisbona, Retorno a Sepharad: La politica de
España hacia sus Judios en el siglo XX (Barcelona: Silex,1993).;
See also Maria Antonio Bel Bravo, Sefarad, Los Judios de
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and the United States, scholars such as Angel Pulido,
himself a Jew, dedicated their careers to settling the
Spanish-Sephardic rift.  Having spoken before the
Cortes, or Spanish Senate, visited the Sephardic
communities in Turkey and met with their chief rabbi,
and written articles for the Spanish press, Pulido
presented an image of a Spain held hostage by a
fervent ultra-nationalistic, Catholic ideology during the
late 19th and early 20th centuries.8  The Jewish intellec-
tual was so well accepted among all echelons of society
that King Alfonso XIII proposed the renewal of a
“Greater Spain” with Sephardim reconciliation as one
of his primary objectives during the first decades of the
20th century.  In this spirit, Spain voted in favor of the
British Mandate for Palestine in 1922, and the Repub-
lican government welcomed Chaim Weizmann, who
would become Israel’s first president, in 1932.  With
the Star of David in the ascendant, the Catholic
Church in Spain became increasingly insecure about
its influence, and this discomfort would come to
influence Franquist policy toward Israel later.  Thus,
the direction of Judeo-Spanish reconciliation, although
promising, was still uncertain immediately before the
largest European civil conflict since the French Revolu-
tion.  To better understand how Judeo-Spanish
relations continued their uncertain path after the
Spanish Civil War propelled the shy Galician Franco to
power requires knowing more about the array of
experiences and influences in the leader’s life that, by
3
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the 1930s, would turn him in his own psychology into
the savior of a historic Spain.
Franco’s Military Exploits and the Foundations of
a Vision
Upon graduation from the Spanish Military Acad-
emy at Toledo in 1910, the 17-year-old short, frail-
looking Second Lieutenant Franco volunteered to serve
in combat in Morocco, where he immersed himself in
Army life and paid extreme attention to personal
attributes like detail and duty.  While developing an
interest in topography and Spanish history, Franco
absorbed the idea of the Army’s moral responsibility as
the “guardian of the essence of the nation.”9 According
to that principle, when a government disgraced its
country by allowing disorder, it was the Army officer’s
duty to combat that government in the name of the
nation.
At the tender age of 20 and despite a growing
reputation for valor in combat, the lieutenant was still
withdrawn, a private contemplative with few friends.
Eschewing the drinking, gambling, and philandering
that dominated the leisure time of many officers in
Spanish Morocco, Franco poured over supply lists and
maps late into the evening.  By 1917, at the age of 24,
his competence and the cunning, yet fatalistic charges
that won him battle after battle in Morocco warranted
him a promotion to major.  After a brief return to
Spain, Franco again ventured across the Straits of
Gibraltar in 1920 where his service to both the French
Foreign Legion and the elite division of the Spanish
Army launched him to the top of the military hierar-
52 Historical Perspectives March 2005
      10Joaquin Arraras, Francisco Franco: The Times and the Man
(Milwaukee: Brace Publishing Co., 1938), 244.
      11Payne, The Franco Regime, 622.;  Chaim Lipschitz, Franco,
Spain, the Jews, and the Holocaust (New York: Ktav Publishing
House, 1984), 9-11.; Preston, Franco, 722.; Haim Avni, Spain,
the Jews, and Franco (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society
of America, 1982), 70, 85, 208.
chy.  When his assignment ended in 1927, he was a
thirty-three-year-old brigadier and one of Europe’s
youngest generals.  The changing political situation in
Spain during the mid-1920s and 1930s, coupled with
important changes in his person life, would catapult
the general to yet unforeseen heights.
In 1923, Franco married Maria del Carmen Polo y
Martinez Valdes, the beautiful 17-year-old daughter of
an affluent Asturian businessman.  She injected into
their upper middle-class household a potent dose of
Catholic piety.  This served as a personal reawakening,
since his pious youth had given way to an irreligious
existence in Morocco, never attending Mass there.  The
apparent lull in the General’s career during this period
was actually of critical importance because it allowed
for the synthesis of a romanticized Spanish military
ideal with the reemergence of Franco’s Catholic beliefs.
As he helplessly watched the collapse of the monarchy
and the proclamation of the Second Republic, Franco’s
renewed Catholicism would become important to the
justification of actions to come.10 
During the political turmoil between 1923 and
1936, Francisco Franco perfected the technique that
several historians conclude characterized his regime –
deliberate and shrewd calculation motivated by self-
preservation.11  On 13 September 1923, disputes over
direct representation, local autonomy in Catalonia and
5
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the Basque Provinces, and foreign, military and social
reform paralyzed the parliamentary system and
ushered in the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera, one of
Franco’s previous superiors.  Five years later, Rivera
established a military academy at Zaragoza for officer
candidates and named Franco its Director.  While the
General possessed the rigid attitude necessary to
provide the prospective officers with a strong founda-
tion in Spanish military psychology and esprit de
corps, his lack of experience in military technology and
theoretical training obligated him to hire a comprehen-
sive staff, and many high-ranking officers in charge
after the Nationalist victory in the Spanish Civil War
were part of this group from 1928-1931.   Although
Rivera’s administration temporarily corrected many of
the breakdowns that overwhelmed the government of
Alfonso XIII, it too succumbed to outside pressures
and collapsed, bringing down the monarchy with it.  It
would not fall, however, without first leaving a lasting
impression on the future Caudillo.  Despite its imper-
fections, the military regime’s relative internal stability
persuaded Franco that dictatorship was the ideal form
of government for Spain.12  
Aware that the balance of power rested with liberal
factions at the start of the 1930s, Franco took great
care not to offend the new administration by deed or
word.  The liberals’ attitude toward Franco, however,
was not as conciliatory.  During the initial transition
from Rivera’s dictatorship to the Second Republic, a
54 Historical Perspectives March 2005
      13Stanley Payne, Franco’s Spain, 5-9.
      14Preston, The Politics of Revenge, 8-12.  
key priority of the left-wing government entailed
eliminating the vestiges of the old order by forcing the
Army’s older, more conservative officers into retire-
ment, thus altering the balance of power within the
Spanish army.13  Furthermore, many of the campaign
promotions that Primo de Rivera awarded Franco were
rescinded, and the general plummeted to the bottom of
the officer seniority list.  His silent acquiescence was
rewarded in 1932, however, when the War Ministry
gave him command of the garrison at La Coruña and,
a year later, the important post of commander at the
Balearic Islands garrison.  After Centrists assumed
power in 1934, relations between the military and the
government greatly improved.  Franco was promoted
to major general and named Commander-in-Chief of
the elite crack divisions in Morocco.  He was then
appointed Chief of the General Staff in May 1935, after
he publicly aligned himself with CEDA, a coalition of
moderate, conservative, and clerical parties.  Franco
took advantage of his role to appoint anti-leftist
officers, but the ensuing crisis caused by the leftist
Popular Front’s victory in February 1936 elections
brought forth newer, far more important priorities.14
Although conservative leaders urged Franco and the
War Ministry to annul the leftist victory and declare
martial law, the General refused.  Removed as Chief of
Staff and, in effect, exiled to the garrison at Tenerife in
the Canary Islands, Franco watched as liberal officers
7
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replaced his conservative nominees for important
posts.15
With tensions increasing between Left and Right,
whispers of a broad military conspiracy to overthrow
the government grew louder.  Led by Brigadier General
Emilio Mola, a cadre of mid-level officers championed
the effort.  Although they represented a broad cross-
section of the political spectrum – monarchists,
fascists, clerical reactionaries, and a collection of
officers without ideological leanings, the primacy of
liberal officers in senior positions put the conspiracy in
a difficult position.  For this reason, Franco’s conser-
vative reputation and respected accomplishments
made him an important potential candidate to repre-
sent the diverse anti-liberal, anti-socialist Junta.
Nevertheless, the exiled General kept his distance.  He
had no desire to destroy a storied career because of an
uncalculated blunder.  On 25 June 1936, he wrote a
letter to President Azaña actually warning him of the
Army’s eroding loyalty, but it went unanswered.16
Only after the Popular Front government created a
Marxist-leaning militia did Franco cast his lot with the
conspirators in July 1936.  Although the General only
had a basic understanding of Spain’s economic and
political intricacies, he was keenly aware of current
public unrest and leftist revolutionary organizations.17
The chaos in Spain had become so problematic that
sitting back any longer and watching matters deterio-
rate was worse than joining the rebels.  Franco also
56 Historical Perspectives March 2005
      18Payne, The Franco Regime, 111.
thought it advantageous to side with the Republican
faction than to face a potentially stronger Leftist
menace later.  Thus, the first phase of a life-long anti-
Communist crusade - the fight against the Popular
Front - had begun.  It was one battle in a campaign
that would deeply impact the way he would be remem-
bered later.
El Caudillo Emerges
Franco’s eventual emergence as the Nationalist
leader was due to a combination of his successes, his
vision, and luck.  Although General Emilio Mola and
other leading conspirators had been eager for the
general to hold an important role in the revolt, General
Jose Sanjurjo had been tapped as its primary leader.
On 20 July 1936, however, Sanjurjo’s plane burst into
flames as it departed from Lisbon and the team of
generals in the Junta de Defensa Nacional invited
Franco to become its ninth member on 3 August 1936.
As the Junta consolidated its coalition of conserva-
tive elements under a unified body, Franco emerged as
the strongest individual member of the movement,
because he commanded the most important of the
Nationalist forces - the Armies of Africa and the South
of Spain.  In an interview a week after he joined the
Junta, Franco categorically announced: “Spain is
Republican and will continue to be so.  Neither the
regime nor the flag have changed.  The only change
will be that crime is replaced by order and acts of
banditry by honest and progressive work.  Spain will
be governed by a corporative system similar to those
installed in Portugal, Italy, and Germany.”18  However,
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five days later, Franco replaced the Republican flag
with the traditional monarchical yellow and red
standard, hailing it as the flag for which patriots had
given their lives in a hundred battles.  A public an-
nouncement of Franco’s leadership, the Junta’s Decree
of 29 September 1936 read: “In accordance with the
resolution adopted by the Junta de Defensa Nacional,
General Francisco Franco Bahamonde is named Chief
of the Government of the Spanish State, and will
assume all the powers of the new State.” 19  His investi-
ture speech in Burgos in early October declared: “You
are placing Spain in my hands.  My hand will be firm,
my pulse will not tremble, and I shall try to raise Spain
to the place that corresponds to her history and her
rank in earlier times.”20
Franco possessed a basic set of beliefs whose
fundamental values changed little in comparison to the
evolution of the regime.21  Franco’s belief in the Span-
ish “essence” resonated with a sense of a mythical
national, Catholic past superseding Jewish and
Muslim identities, one that could resurface as a force
behind the modern Catholic “Spanishness” for which
he lobbied.  He had also come to the conclusion that
Spain could not adapt to a parliamentary system, and
he saw himself as a bulwark against all that he ab-
horred: Communism, Marxism, Masonry, materialism,
and internationalism.
The Church provided Franco with much of the
propaganda he would adopt to publicly define himself
after the Nationalist victory.  The image of Franco as a
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modern Catholic crusader was promoted by Enrique
Pley y Deniel, Bishop of Salamanca.  A letter on 30
September 1936 quoted Augustine of Hippo and
compared the “earthly city,” or Republican zone, where
Communism and anarchy reigned, with the celestial,
or Nationalist zone, where heroism and love of God
prevailed.  Toward the end of the war, on 16 April
1939, Pope Pius XII gave Franco his apostolic blessing
and praised him for his “noble and Christian senti-
ments.”22  Feverishly committed to retaining power and
now backed by the Church, he believed that the
Nationalists had an absolute right to suppress Repub-
lican supporters.  Victory, according to Franco, had to
be complete.
Consequently, one of his first acts as Head of State
was to ban all leftist and liberal parties.  The Falangist
state was to be a “national syndicalist state” in which
“the state, to discipline the economy, employs the
instrument of the syndicates.”23  He admired the social
programs of those regimes that had helped his victory
over the Leftists – Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.24
Yet, Spanish authoritarianism, as Franco called it, was
not derived from Hitler’s National Socialism or Musso-
lini’s fascismo, but instead from the centralized mon-
archy of Ferdinand and Isabella.  This revived “integral
nationalism” would somewhat base itself upon
Franco’s perceptions of the Spanish Golden Age,
including the intolerant conventions of Spanish
government and society, such as the “Black Legend” -
the myth of the Inquisition’s genocidal barbarism.
11
Cardenas: Franco and the Jews
Published by Scholar Commons, 2005
Franco and the Jews 57
      19Ibid., 116.
      20Ibid.
      21Preston, Franco, 10.
five days later, Franco replaced the Republican flag
with the traditional monarchical yellow and red
standard, hailing it as the flag for which patriots had
given their lives in a hundred battles.  A public an-
nouncement of Franco’s leadership, the Junta’s Decree
of 29 September 1936 read: “In accordance with the
resolution adopted by the Junta de Defensa Nacional,
General Francisco Franco Bahamonde is named Chief
of the Government of the Spanish State, and will
assume all the powers of the new State.” 19  His investi-
ture speech in Burgos in early October declared: “You
are placing Spain in my hands.  My hand will be firm,
my pulse will not tremble, and I shall try to raise Spain
to the place that corresponds to her history and her
rank in earlier times.”20
Franco possessed a basic set of beliefs whose
fundamental values changed little in comparison to the
evolution of the regime.21  Franco’s belief in the Span-
ish “essence” resonated with a sense of a mythical
national, Catholic past superseding Jewish and
Muslim identities, one that could resurface as a force
behind the modern Catholic “Spanishness” for which
he lobbied.  He had also come to the conclusion that
Spain could not adapt to a parliamentary system, and
he saw himself as a bulwark against all that he ab-
horred: Communism, Marxism, Masonry, materialism,
and internationalism.
The Church provided Franco with much of the
propaganda he would adopt to publicly define himself
after the Nationalist victory.  The image of Franco as a
58 Historical Perspectives March 2005
      22Ibid.
      23Payne, The Franco Regime, 117, 119, 169.
      24Ibid., 22.
modern Catholic crusader was promoted by Enrique
Pley y Deniel, Bishop of Salamanca.  A letter on 30
September 1936 quoted Augustine of Hippo and
compared the “earthly city,” or Republican zone, where
Communism and anarchy reigned, with the celestial,
or Nationalist zone, where heroism and love of God
prevailed.  Toward the end of the war, on 16 April
1939, Pope Pius XII gave Franco his apostolic blessing
and praised him for his “noble and Christian senti-
ments.”22  Feverishly committed to retaining power and
now backed by the Church, he believed that the
Nationalists had an absolute right to suppress Repub-
lican supporters.  Victory, according to Franco, had to
be complete.
Consequently, one of his first acts as Head of State
was to ban all leftist and liberal parties.  The Falangist
state was to be a “national syndicalist state” in which
“the state, to discipline the economy, employs the
instrument of the syndicates.”23  He admired the social
programs of those regimes that had helped his victory
over the Leftists – Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy.24
Yet, Spanish authoritarianism, as Franco called it, was
not derived from Hitler’s National Socialism or Musso-
lini’s fascismo, but instead from the centralized mon-
archy of Ferdinand and Isabella.  This revived “integral
nationalism” would somewhat base itself upon
Franco’s perceptions of the Spanish Golden Age,
including the intolerant conventions of Spanish
government and society, such as the “Black Legend” -
the myth of the Inquisition’s genocidal barbarism.
12
Historical Perspectives: Santa Clara University Undergraduate Journal of History, Series II, Vol. 10 [2005], Art. 8
http://scholarcommons.scu.edu/historical-perspectives/vol10/iss1/8
Franco and the Jews 59
      25Lipschitz, Franco, Spain, the Jews, and the Holocaust, 16-20.
The Emerging Dictatorship, Jewish Memory, and
the Heyday of National-Catholic Identity
While much can and has been said about the
brutal character of Franco’s regime, this study ana-
lyzes the generally overlooked and vexing problem of
how his policy toward Jews complicated the Jewish
response to his regime and his person.  The devastat-
ing war between 1936 and 1939 was arguably largely
responsible for the image of Franco that would thwart
attempts at Judeo-Spanish reconciliation thereafter.
His fascist coalition derided in orchestrated campaigns
the radical and “communist Jews” who had champi-
oned the Republican cause that Franco considered
impious and anti-Spanish.  A strong intellectual and
financial base for the Republican movement, liberal
Jews proved a formidable foe for the fascist National-
ists.  However, by strategically linking a Jewish Repub-
lican plot with long-disliked progressive Catalan
separatists, the Falange was able to galvanize Spanish
public opinion in its favor.  Ultimately, it is debatable
whether Franco himself stirred up anti-Semitic senti-
ment among the Falange or whether he allowed them
to decry the “Judeo-Catalan” conspiracy in order to
sustain its popularity.  Although anti-Semitic epithets
can be found in the general’s speeches, they are
remarkably few by comparison with the virulent anti-
Jewish rhetoric in fascist newspapers.25
Domestically, the1940s and early 1950s marked
the heyday of Franco’s image of a Spain based on an
anachronistic amalgam of medieval romanticism,
nationalism and a re-born sense of destiny.  Having
acted to outlaw opposition parties, control all media
60 Historical Perspectives March 2005
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and insert pro-Franco rhetoric into the educational
curriculum, El Caudillo monopolized the discourse
about Spanish identity.  His 1942 Raza, a semi-bio-
graphical novel, exalted a nation and people born out
of the ashes of fierce conflict.  As for Franco himself, it
presented him as a “gift from God,” a popular theme in
the period’s educational curricula, that protected
Spain’s Catholic roots.  Jose Churruca, the story’s
main character, incarnated the dictator’s idea of his
nation - resilient, crusading, protective, and spiritual.26
The Nationalist fervor born out of victory in the Civil
War also influenced the regime’s economic policy.
Eschewing international trade, Franco’s autarkic
measures played a dual role during the administra-
tion’s early years.  While these served as an economic
manifestation of Spain’s independence and a post-
World War II response to international ostracism, the
harsh realities of running a country trumped the
ideological constructs of Spanish identity.  As starva-
tion became a tangible problem, Franco’s coffers
suffered.  It was in this context that Franco courted
limited diplomatic relations with Israel in hopes of
easing Spanish international isolation.27    
The only clear evidence of any personal ill will
toward the Jewish people was Franco’s reaction to
Israel’s 1949 U.N. vote against admitting Spain to that
body as punishment for his alliance with Hitler in the
Spanish Civil War and Axis sympathy in World War II.
On 16 May 1949, Israeli ambassador to the United
Nations Abba Eban responded to a proposal by several
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Latin American countries to lift the U.N.’s diplomatic
boycott against Franco’s regime:
The United Nations has arisen out of the suffer-
ings of a martyred generation, which included
six million dead…That memory alone will deter-
mine Israel’s attitude.  While the Israeli delega-
tion would not for one moment assert that the
Spanish regime had any direct part in the policy
of extermination, it does maintain that Franco
Spain had been an active and sympathetic ally
of the regime that had been responsible for that
policy and thus contributed to its effective-
ness…For Israel, the essential point is the
association of the Franco regime with the Nazi-
Fascist alliance that corroded the moral founda-
tions of civilized life and inflicted upon the
human race its most terrible and devastating
ordeal…28
While Franco did not officially recognize Israel in
1948 because of personal ties to Arab states dating
back to his career as a leader of a Muslim brigade in
Morocco, his regime approached the nascent nation as
part of a strategy to overcome the barriers keeping it
out of the United Nations.  For example, prior to the
aforementioned vote, Franco authorized a Jewish
synagogue to operate in Spain for the first time since
62 Historical Perspectives March 2005
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others give a range of lives saved.  The secrecy, in many cases, of
the various operations led to an inaccurate reporting of
numbers.
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the Civil War. The Israeli critique above ignored not
only Franco’s efforts in saving 20,000 to 60,000
European Jews during World War II and after it, but
also the delicate political situation that Franco suc-
cessfully navigated to avoid joining the Axis at Ger-
many’s behest.29  In the complicated history of rela-
tions between Spain and the Jewish people, Franco’s
rescue of the Jews during World War II had little
recognizable effect on the official Israeli stance toward
him later.  By labeling El Caudillo as a Nazi collabora-
tor and disregarding his pro-Jewish actions, the Israeli
government crafted a dubious place for him in Judeo-
Spanish history. 
El Caudillo’s rescue of thousands of Jews had a
prior legal basis.  The 1924 Primo de Rivera law
provided that any individual of Spanish ancestry living
outside Spain was entitled to the privileges of Spanish
citizenship without ever having to set foot in the
country.  Franco first oversaw the execution of this law
in 1924 and 1925 when, as an army major, he evacu-
ated several hundred Jews from the Moroccan port city
of Tetuan.  This law did more than simply entitle
Sephardic Jews to Spanish citizenship; it afforded
them the protection of the government.30  Sephardim
living abroad were under the authority of Spanish
sovereignty.  The Germans accepted Franco’s law
almost without question, because in the Spanish-Nazi
relationship, El Caudillo had leverage over his German
counterpart.
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Germany expected Spain to enter World War II on
the Axis side after aiding Franco in his defeat of the
Republicans.  Franco, however, was not eager to win
one war just to enter a larger war against the Allies.
The regime’s quarrel did lay with the Communists and
their sympathizers, but not to the extent that Franco
could realistically charge into the Axis camp.  It would
not have been popular among his supporters, and the
Head of State would not plunge Spain into a new
round of political and social turmoil.  Although Spain
allowed Nazi u-boats to patrol its waters, its assistance
to the Fuhrer would not amount to much more than
mouthing the party line at the onset of the war in
order to keep the Wehrmacht out of the Pyrenees.
Hitler could not force Spain into the war against her
will either.  Risking a guerilla war on his rear should
he cross the Pyrenees into the Basque country was too
great a risk for Germany to take while Franco at least
appeared to be an active sympathizer.  Franco con-
stantly put off entering the war, much to Hitler’s
annoyance, by requesting items like large quantities of
gasoline that he knew Germany could not dispense
with.  When, in the early months of 1943, the Germans
concluded that Spain would never enter the conflict,
they had no alternative but to curse themselves.31  The
Spanish leader’s policy of issuing visas to claimants of
Sephardic ancestry in occupied territories and letting
others cross the Pyrenees and reach refugee camps in
Navarre annoyed German authorities, and there was a
faction of German generals advocating attacking
Spain. The German Navy actually sunk a Spanish
vessel as a warning shot to the dictator, but Franco
64 Historical Perspectives March 2005
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did not alter his outwardly ambiguous stance.  After
the war, official Israeli policy, by indicting Franco,
would fail to evaluate the complex political situations
that he overcame domestically during the Civil War
and internationally during World War II.
Cold War Politics and Israeli-Spanish Reconciliation
Israel’s initial rejection of Franco’s Spain resulted
partly from its own internal political complexities.  In
1950, the leaders of the Sephardic communities in a
dozen cities worldwide telegraphed Israeli Prime
Minister David Ben-Gurion in another vain attempt to
get Israel to lift the Spanish blockade.  Their efforts
were blocked by what they saw as the Ashkenazi-
dominated government’s move to display its suprem-
acy over the Sephardim.  The Ashkenazi (Jews of
eastern European descent) Mapai and Mapam parties,
both socialist and committed to left-wing causes,
preserved the image of Franco as a Nazi sympathizer
regardless of signs of a more sympathetic Sephardic
perspective.32  During the mid-1950s, when Spain was
finally admitted into the U.N. and established an overt
alliance with the United States, Franco had the oppor-
tunity to combine the rebirth of the crusade, now
versus Communism, which was always central to his
interpretation of Spanish history with a move to
improve his relations with Israel.  The two nations
found themselves in the same geopolitical situation.
Both buffers against Communist expansion, Spain
would be for the western Mediterranean what Israel
was for the eastern Mediterranean – a strategic out-
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post.33  Even though Spain had finally been released
from its forced diplomatic obscurity and was moderniz-
ing its economy based on an increasingly sophisticated
technocracy in the late 1950s, the memory of Spanish
volunteers fighting on the side of the Axis during the
Second World War still kept the possibility of an Israeli
reconciliation remote. 
Franco’s rescue of the Jews was not finished in the
1940s, however.  In response to a 1956-1960 cam-
paign to relocate 2,733 Moroccan Jews from the ports
of Ceuta and Melilla to Israel via Malaga, Israeli
Sephardim urged their government to court Spain.34
Despite protests from Franco’s Arab allies, Sephardim
leaders in both countries promoted an exhibition of
books on the Sephardic experience in Spain.  In 1960,
General Franco hosted a Sephardic delegation that
included the Chief Sephardic Rabbi of Great Britain,
and Spain established the Institute of Sephardi Stud-
ies in the following year.35  Culturally, ties between the
two nations increased, but that could not derail the
political stalemate reached during the Six-Day War of
1967.  
This war also had a profound impact among more
sensitive Spanish politicians, who thought that Israel’s
lightning victory over the Arab coalition called into
question the extent to which Franco should follow a
pro-Arab foreign policy.  However, this change in
opinion was neutralized by later Israeli policy toward
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Gibraltar.  When the Spanish government put forth a
resolution seeking to wrest Gibraltar away from British
hands in December 1967, Spain’s Arab allies voted in
favor, but Israel abstained on the grounds that Franco
had allowed volunteers to fight on Hitler’s side while
Gibraltar held out as an allied stronghold during
World War II.  Again, the influence of Franco’s pro-Axis
image came to bear on Cold War politics and Israeli-
Spanish reconciliation.  Nevertheless, cooperation did
exist between the two countries’ secret services, and
American pressure forced Spain to make available the
American base at Rota as a logistical staging point for
Israeli missions during the 1973 Yom Kippur War.  
By this time, Franco had begun fighting a series of
serious illnesses which rapidly weakened him.  The
consummate crusader, Franco clung to life for two
years while his government decided its future.  The
young prince Juan Carlos II, Franco’s appointed
successor since 1947, welcomed establishing official
diplomatic relations with Israel.  Such a step would
improve the image of Spain in the United States, as it
was the last Western European nation without rela-
tions with Jerusalem.  However, acting Prime Minister
Adolfo Suarez inherited from Franco a fragile relation-
ship with Spain’s Arab allies; approximately 90% of
Spain’s petroleum was supplied by Iran and its neigh-
bors.  This dependency created a rift between the
United States, who felt that Spain was being black-
mailed, and the Spanish government, who was not yet
ready to handle confronting the Arab world.  In 1979,
Suarez welcomed a visit from PLO Chairman Yasser
Arafat and sparked controversy among European and
American observers.  Spain and Israel would not speak
of diplomatic ties for another six years.  
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The rise of the socialist PSOE government in the
mid-1980s under Felipe Gonzalez brought to fruition
a process begun in the early days of Francisco
Franco’s regime.  Although Franco was frustrated by
the political nature of the Spanish-Israeli reconcilia-
tion process and viewed the plight of the Sephardim as
a question of “Spanish identity,” the socialist Gonzalez
galvanized the voices of those repressed by Franco’s
regime to create an image that was congruent with the
Jewish memory of El Caudillo.  Those who remem-
bered the Spanish Republic, the International Bri-
gades, and the early anti-Franco struggle now spear-
headed the creation of cultural links that led to the
events of April 14, 1986.  On that day, Spanish Am-
bassador Pedro Lopez Aguirrebengoa presented his
diplomatic papers in Jerusalem and was greeted by
President Yitzhak Herzog with “Welcome after 500
years!”  King Juan Carlos II declared, “Spain has
overcome a situation that had not corresponded with
our own history nor with the present course of our
country.”  Achieving the status of a credible, modern,
parliamentary democracy required that Spain, accord-
ing to its own standards, finally meet this critical goal.
Examining Franco’s regime through the Jewish-
Israeli lens reveals one of the General’s key shortcom-
ings; he took criticism of Spain as a personal insult.
A personal bitterness toward the Israeli governments
of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s arguably created yet
another obstacle to reconciliation.  It appears that the
exit of Franco was a necessary step in the final diplo-
matic recognition ten years after his death.  Both
Franco’s regime and Felipe Gonzalez’ PSOE Party
viewed relations with Israel as a historic problem
grounded in the plight of the Sephardim.  Perhaps the
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Israelis needed the equivalent of a pacto del olvido for
themselves that would erase El Caudillo Axis ties from
the Judeo-Spanish historical record.  
As Spain and Israel enjoy full diplomatic relations
today, El Caudillo’s influence on the end result goes
uncelebrated and largely unrecognized.  Although
Franco had the power to create and institutionalize a
uniquely Spanish memory that he felt had been lost as
Spain declined from its zenith to the backwater it
became into the 19th and 20th centuries, he could not
guarantee the preservation of a positive memory for
himself after his death.  Franco’s inability to bridge the
gap between a personally relevant, politically sound,
economically expedient Arab friendship and an Israeli
alliance probably arose from the contradiction posed
for Franco’s policy makers between “Spanishness” as
a mythologized intellectual and cultural exclusiveness
on the one hand and a nostalgic inclusiveness on the
other, evidenced by the general’s protection of both
Sephardic and Ashkenazi Jews.
Ultimately, Franco may share the same fate as his
suppressed domestic political opponents – remem-
bered only by those he personally impacted.  El Pacto
del olvido, in its refusal to open a so-called Pandora’s
Box, forced those who were silenced under the regime
to accept that there would not be any public recogni-
tion of their past lives and memories.36   It can be
noted here that collective memory may result from a
deliberate campaign to define an identity.  It does not
exist without the social commentators, analysts,
politicians, and historians who choose how it is
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constructed.  By either omitting or focusing on partic-
ular details about El Caudillo’s life, contemporary
Spaniards and Israelis have created a particularly
complicated memory of him in the complex history of
Judeo-Spanish relations.
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      2Aristotle Onassis’s age is the subject of dispute.  Onassis
claimed that he was born in 1906, but that as a teenager he told
Argentinean officials he was born in 1900 in order to get a job,
making him either twenty-three or twenty-nine years older than
Jacqueline Kennedy.
From Saint to Sinner and Back Again:
Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis Rehabilitates
Her Image
Kelsey Swanson
It is not uncommon for people to fall from grace
due to a vast array of reasons, including divorce,
crime, and debt.  Can the fallen possibly redeem
themselves in the eyes of those who matter most?  The
case of Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis offers a powerful
example of the role that the disgraced can play in
rebuilding their images.  On 20 October 1968, Jacque-
line Kennedy, previously beloved as the brave widow of
the slain President of the United States, shocked the
world, not by wearing a new Valentino or trying out a
new hairstyle, but by getting married.  Headlines
across the globe exclaimed: “America has Lost a Saint,”
“Jackie, How Could You?” and “Jack Kennedy Dies
Today a Second Time.”1  What heinous act caused
people around the world to recoil in disbelief and
disgust?   The beautiful, young widow of the beloved
President John F. Kennedy did not remarry a youthful,
handsome American.  Instead, the thirty-nine year-old
Jacqueline Kennedy married Aristotle Onassis, a Greek
twenty-three years her senior.2  Not only was Onassis
older and extremely wealthy, but he was also foreign,
23
Cardenas: Franco and the Jews
Published by Scholar Commons, 2005
